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STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC
EXPANSION
АНОТАЦІЯ. В останні роки все зростаюча увага приділяється різним аспек-
там демографічної експансії, яка, думку автора, у деяких країнах суттєво
впливає на рівень національної безпеки цих країн. В статті розглянуто нау-
кові підходи до оцінювання демографічної експансії та пропонується авто-
рський підхід до побудови і коректного застосування відповідної системи
статистичних показників. За допомогою цієї системи проаналізовано осно-
вні соціальні та економічні наслідки процесу нерегульованої міграції в Україну
мешканців інших країн протягом останніх 15 років.
КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА: демографічна статистика, демографічна безпека,
демографічна експансія, статистичне оцінювання демографічної експа-
нсії, система показників демографічної експансії.
АННОТАЦИЯ. В последние годы всевозрастающее внимание уделяется
различным аспектам демографической экспансии, которая, по мнению
автора, в некоторых странах существенно влияет на уровень нацио-
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нальной безопасности этих стран. В статье рассмотрены научные по-
дходы к оценке демографической экспансии и предлагается авторский
подход к построению и корректному применению соответствующей
системы статистических показателей. С помощью этой системы
проанализированы основные социальные и экономические последствия
процесса нерегулируемой миграции в Украину жителей других стран в
течение последних 15 лет.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: демографическая статистика, демографическая
безопасность, демографическая экспансия, статистическое оценива-
ние демографической экспансии, система показателей демографичес-
кой экспансии.
ABSTRACT. In recent years increasing attention is given to various aspects of
demographic expansion that, according to the author’s point of view, results in
some countries a significant impact on national security level in these countries.
In the article the different scientific approaches to the evaluation of
demographic expansion are considered and the own one that provides
methodology to develop and correctly apply for these purposes an
comprehensive system of statistical indicators. Using this this system main
social and economic consequences of unregulated migration to Ukraine of
inhabitants from other countries are analyzed.
KEY WORDS: demographic statistics, demographic security, demographic
expansion, statistical estimation of demographic expansion, system of
indicators to measure demographic expansion.
INTRODUCTION
Many observers believe that the recent growth of migration into
Western Europe from the underdeveloped countries (especially from
Asia, Africa and Latin America) and developing countries (especially
from the ex-Soviet Union countries) as well as into the Eastern
European countries from the area mentioned above is the beginning of
a new major wave of immigration. The theoretical and empirical
studies made so far, neither give a sufficient basis for answering this
question, nor for producing solid predictions about future international
migration. Several of the classic questions have to be asked anew.
Theories and facts from research in several academic disciplines have
to be combined; explanatory factors and their interrelations have to be
examined. It is also should be defined what does it mean ‘potential
migration’, ‘migration pressure’ or ‘demographic/migration
expansion’. Relevant development factors as well as the impact of
these factors on future international migration and economic
development have to be measured.
ACTUAL SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES OVERVIEW
European migration policy is currently in a period of crisis and
transition. Efforts are being made by states and international
organizations to establish a functioning system of migration control into
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Europe (both Western as well as Eastern European countries) from all
parts of the world, but especially from the Middle East and North
Africa. This new control system will be more efficient and restrictive
than previous systems. At the same time, the idea is to harmonize the
member states’ migration policies within the European Union,
removing internal borders to create a European free circulation of labor.
There are a number of reasons for this crisis in migration policy.
The economic and political insecurity is, of course, one of these
reasons. Future mass migration from East to West was initially seen as
an immediate threat, but instead came the extraordinarily large
refugee flows from the civil wars and terror in former Yugoslavia. As
a result, for several decades, and despite all control measures,
international population movements have continuously grown and
have become more and more global. Forecasts have repeatedly said
that migration from the South and East would soon grow out of
proportion, if radical measures would not be taken. First of all, the
demographic explosion has far from come to an end.
Figures on unemployment are extremely difficult to use in
international comparisons. Unemployment and underemployment are
measured in various ways within Europe, and statistics from countries
in the South and East often underestimate the desperate situation
prevailing there. An often quoted scenarios, the inflow of young
women and men into the labor market of those less developed
countries will grow by more than 500-700 million during the period
2010-2020, and this could be compared to the size of the total labor
market of the developed countries in 1990 of about 600 million.
Finally, during the last 15-20 years, several new states have been
born in Eastern Europe, and in efforts to build new nation states,
inflamed ethnic conflicts have resulted in civil wars, incredible human
suffering, and large refugee movements. The idea of the nation state is
still extremely strong. One nation and one state remains the ideal,
although it is nowhere completely realized. Furthermore, the state still
has the central power to decide how material and immaterial values
and goods are distributed among its citizens. This distribution takes
place via national political institutions, but more power is being
transferred to supranational units like the European Union. This is one
reason why immigration and immigration policies have become
salient issues everywhere in Europe. The states are anxious to
preserve their control of what are for them the most basic elements,
like their territory, their nation and demos, and their system of
national representation. Therefore, they put much effort into their
national immigration control, reluctant to give up decisions, for
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instance, on the free circulation of those citizens of non-member states
who are residents of a member state.
A great deal has been written about the causes of international
migration. Given the background sketched above of a crisis in
immigration and refugee policy, and given several other serious global
problems of the 1990s, it is obvious that not just labor migration, or
economic factors must be explained. Political factors and refugee
migration must be explained as well. Furthermore, a study must be made
of family migration, migration for learning or self-realization, or for the
sake of adventure or for ethnic, religious, cultural, racial reasons, etc.
Indeed, various kinds of international migration must be explained, but
models are also required, which are able to account for a great number of
explanatory factors, as well as for the dynamics in their interrelations.
So far, studies of international migration have primarily
emphasized labor migration and therefore economic theories about
‘push and pull’, about wage differentials, about supply and demand of
labor in two or more labor markets, about the mobility of the
production factor labor, and several combinations of these and others.
However, these economic theories have, up until recently,
underestimated or even completely ignored the role of the state. This
neglect seems to imply that there would be no difference between
internal (free) and international (controlled) migration, nor between
regulated and controlled migration between states and international
migration within an area of free circulation of labor.
In fact, almost all states do their best to control and regulate
immigration. It is in this way that states determine which migration flows
are legitimate and which are not. Legitimacy is not established by high
abstract principles, but by inducement, control, and deterrence usually
established unilaterally by the receiving state, but sometimes in
agreements or treaties between receiving and sending states. The size and
composition of migration flows into a West European country have
regularly been under political control since beginning of the last century,
with the exception of a period of relaxed control between 1945 and 1975.
METHODOLOGY OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC EXPANSION
STATISTICAL EVALUATION
Trying to define migration pressure is a problem, not to mention
operationalisation and measurement. The ILO has devoted several
publications to this topic that have described migration pressure as
building up «because more people seek to obtain better employment
and income-earning opportunities or relief from political repression
and human rights abuses than other countries are prepared to make
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available» (2001). In other words these publications include
economic, political and ethnical migration, and they see pressure
and/or expansion as the result of more people wanting to go than there
are destinations available for them. Already here the problem is
encountered of measuring how many ‘seek’ to go. We could make a
narrow delimitation and lose most of those who might be inclined to
emigrate, or at the other end of the spectrum everyone could be
included. The decision will have to be a subjective one.
Of course it is just as difficult to say how many countries are
prepared to admit the migrants. Very few countries have fixed the
amount of annual intake. Most countries allow for some immigrants
and not for others, for example, for some professionals but not for
unskilled workers, or for ‘genuine’ refugees but not for war refugees.
Democratic welfare states cannot live without immigration control.
But completely closed borders are not a realistic option. Most states
are unable or unwilling to make their control fully efficient. They
cannot close all illegal routes into the country, nor ruthlessly hunt
illegal residents or illegal workers. Economic interests are often
involved and furthermore, immigrants from some countries may be
given some extra privileges.
But it still seems as if recent, more restrictive control has had a
remarkable impact on immigration, from both Eastern Europe and from
non-European countries. Selection among applicants also takes place in
such states where the immigration stop is said to be absolute. A few
aliens are always welcome. And even at present, in this restrictive period
in Europe, immigrants are relatively easily admitted at least as temporary
residents, under the condition that they come from affluent parts of the
world, and if they are qualified professionals or artists, or (in some
countries) if they have enough money. Tourists and visitors are also
selectively allowed to enter. Persons coming from some neighbouring
countries or from countries with special relations with the receiving state
or people of the same ethnicity or nationality may be given special
preference and may be exempted from visa requirements.
An immigration country’s general prevention strategy is of course
based on its regulation policy and on how strict this policy is being
applied. Visa requirements and requirements to obtain residence and
work permits before arrival give clear signals to the rest of the world,
especially when they are combined with agreements with transit
countries that potential migrants will not be allowed to pass through
their territory. In combination with the first asylum principle, this also
implies that asylum-seekers will not easily be able to find their way to
more distant countries.
50
But general prevention is first of all the result of how liberal or
how restrictive an image a country has created through its policy over
a long period of time, and also of how it can change this image by
drastic measures (detention of asylum-seekers, deportation of those
refused, or other forms of deterrence), or by information campaigns,
including targeted information to certain groups of people in one
country. As mentioned, democratic welfare states cannot be
completely closed societies. They will always allow selected
immigration and, among these, family reunion and political refugees.
On the other hand, through strict controls and after a rigid selection,
they may exclude those who from their point of view are undesirable
potential migrants, such as migrant workers or citizens from certain
parts of the world.
Within the migration pressure it is very important and valuable to
distinguish the demographic expansion.
According to the author’s definition, the demographic expansion
— is the process of reducing the proportion of indigenous people in
the country (community, specific area) that results, basically, in
reducing the role of indigenous population in the political, social and
economic life due to the natural movement and migration of non-
indigenous people, who are not willing to accept the social, ethnic,
religious, etc. foundations and traditions of this country (community,
specific area).
Emigration statistics show that emigrants are usually relatively
young (18 to 30 years of age), often unmarried men, sometimes
recently married couples with or without a first child. In other words,
age may be a hindrance to emigration. It may be more difficult to
move when children are already in schools or when they are teenagers
than before these ages. It may be easier for men than for women
because of prevailing gender roles, but the extent of this may differ
from country to country and from time to time. Emigration of women
may often follow the emigration of men, but the opposite may also be
true.
Emigration may be more difficult for those who have a job, have
rented accommodation or even possess a house, have started a family,
are active in some secular or religious community, etc. etc. Migration
may be easier when people start working and form their families than
any other time in life. A job, a house, property, family, social
relations, and commitments may be seen as obstacles to emigration. It
may require something extra to overcome these obstacles.
A number of factors related to the individual’s age and gender may
neither further nor impede emigration. A few characteristics tied to
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the individual have been mentioned here. Several others might be
mentioned, including personality factors. But let us turn to some of
the many obstacles to emigration which follow from the organization
of those states and societies in which potential emigrants are living.
We should also look for ‘structural’ or ‘cultural’ obstacles to
emigration and study them closely. Here follows only a first list of a
number of possible suggestions. Each one must be qualified in
individual cases. Here they are merely listed, as they cannot be further
elaborated in this paper.
The premise here is that immigration control is and will be seen as
an absolute necessity for a democratic welfare state, but this does not
imply a policy of zero migration. Control is needed for the protection
of the ethnic nation, and of the economic labor force, all crucial to a
European state’s understanding of itself as a state, a nation, and a
national economy, where the state has the authority to decide about
the distribution of goods, where there is a public sector requiring
taxation, and where social equality, welfare, full employment, and no
inflation are central goals. Immigration control can be coordinated
with other states, harmonized within a larger supranational unit like
the European unit, but cannot be dispensed with. Sudden mass
migration to a country, unforeseen and beyond the control of the state,
could become a major threat to the state’s security, a threat which
states try to avoid by various means.
However, there are many types of control: external control at or
outside the borders, or internal control of aliens already in the state.
Control in some countries is to a large extent explicit in laws and
regulations, while in others it is implicit in social and political
institutions. Furthermore, control may be public but also partly
private. It may be rude, militarized, discretionary, including the right
to search individual persons, to detain non-citizens, and divide
husband and wife, in short, showing little or no respect for aliens as
individual human beings on visits, only because these visits are
irregular. Or control may be the opposite: in other words, a decent,
civilized legal control system in which due process and just treatment
is guaranteed. Finally, control may be more or less efficient, and it
may infer not only monetary costs, but also have a great number of
other foreseen or unforeseen consequences.
It is quite important to determinate the system of statistical
indicators to be used for the quantitative and qualitative measurement
of the demographic expansion. There are so many researches who
consider the relevant development factors as well as the impact of
these factors on economic development have to be measured.
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Table 1





Number of children and young people
(pupils) of non-indigenous population as a
percentage to the TOTAL NUMBER OF
POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY
Dr. Igor Berkut, Ukraine
(http://bratbook.com.ua)
1. Number of non-indigenous population or
non-indigenous persons affiliated to other
religious as a percentage to the TOTAL
NUMBER OF POPULATION;
2) Availability of informal parallel
institutions created by the non-indigenous
population;
3) Number of stocks and/or marches, etc. with
the requirements to the Government,
organized by non-Aboriginal people.
Аriel Gordon, Israel,
(http://gazeta.rjews.net)
1) Number of non-Aboriginal people;
2) Dynamics of the non-indigenous
population;
3) Share of non-Aboriginal people;




1) Number of non-Aboriginal people;
2) Dynamics of the non-indigenous
population;
3) Number of households of non-indigenous
population;
4) Ratio of the fertility levels of the
indigenous and non-indigenous populations.
Taking into consideration all mentioned above and summarizing
all of the points of view in regard to the to the demographic expansion
statistical evaluation, we would like to suggest the following
conceptual scheme of the system of the demographic expansion
statistical indicators.
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Chart 1. Logical structure of the system
of the demographic expansion indicators
Once the conceptual framework is finalized, the next step in
completing the monitoring and evaluation framework is selecting
indicators. Indicators are signs of progress — they are used to
determine whether the programme or/and intervention is on its way to
achieving its objectives and goals. 
It is well-known that an indicator is a specific, observable and
measurable characteristic that can be used to show changes or
progress a programme is making toward achieving a specific outcome.
Obviously that according to the statistical methodology it should be:
• at least one indicator for each outcome (objective);
• the indicator should be focused, clear and specific. The change
measured by the indicator should represent progress that the
programme hopes to make;
• an indicator should be defined in precise, unambiguous terms
that describe clearly and exactly what is being measured.
Very often one has to answer a simple question — How many
indicators are enough? Responding to this question it is necessary to
take into consideration some guidelines to follow when selecting
indicators:
o At least one or two indicators per result (ideally, from different
sources);
o At least one indicator for every core activity;
o No more than 8-10 indicators per area of significant programme
focus;
It is also important to remember the difference between process
and results indicators. Process Indicators are used to monitor the
number and types of activities carried out, while Results
Indicators are used to evaluate whether or not the activity achieved
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the intended objectives or results. Monitoring and evaluation
frameworks and plans should incorporate both process and results
indicators.
Following this conceptual guidelines, the system of the statistical
indicators needed for the demographic expansion evaluation has been
developed.
Table 2
SYSTEM OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC EXPANSION STATISTICAL INDICATORS
1. Indicators of the internal
demographic expansion
2. Indicators of the external
demographic expansion
3. Indicators of the social
and economic consequences
of the internal and external
demographic expansion
• Ratio of the fertility levels
of the indigenous and non-
indigenous population;
• Ratio of mortality of
indigenous and non-
indigenous population;
• Ratio of replacement
levels of indigenous and
non-indigenous population;




• Ratio of the coefficients
of the natural growth of
indigenous and non-
indigenous people
• Number and dynamics of
the non-indigenous
population, who came to the
territory during the last
year;
• Total number of non-
indigenous population, who
arrived in the country
during the certain period of
time (cumulative val);
• Ratio of the number of
non-indigenous people, who
had come to the territory for
the year, the average annual
number of indigenous
people;
• Level and dynamics of
immigration rate of non-
indigenous population in the
Total number of population
•  Proportion of the
indigenous population in the
total population;
• Dynamics of the
proportion of the indigenous
population in the total
population;
• Proportion of the
indigenous population in the
total population growth
• Dynamics of the
proportion of the indigenous
population in the total
population growth
• Ratio of the rate of
growth of the indigenous
and non-indigenous
population;
• Proportion of indigenous
people in the state and local
Governments;
• Proportion of Aboriginal
people in key sectors of the
economy;
• Proportion of indigenous
people in the business and
private property (land, real
estate, finance)
• Dynamics of the
expansion of the territorial
enclaves of non-indigenous
population.
Next step of the demographic expansion statistical evaluation is in
the corresponding composite indicator development. Composite
indicators (CIs) which identify common trends across many separate
indicators are increasingly recognized as a useful tool in policy
analysis. Such composite indicators provide simple comparisons of
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countries (specific areas) with a significative numbers of migrants that
can be used to illustrate complex and sometimes elusive issues in
wide-ranging fields.
However, composite indicators can send misleading policy
messages if they are poorly constructed or misinterpreted. Their “big
picture” results may invite users (especially policy-makers) to draw
simplistic analytical or policy conclusions. In fact, composite
indicators must be seen as a means of initiating discussion and
stimulating public interest. Their relevance should be gauged with
respect to constituencies affected by the composite index.
In general terms, an indicator is a quantitative or a qualitative
measure derived from a series of observed facts that can reveal
relative positions (e.g. of a country or/and specific area) in a given
sphere. When evaluated at regular intervals, an indicator can point out
the direction of change across different units and through time. They
can also be helpful in setting policy priorities and in benchmarking or
monitoring performance. A composite indicator is formed when
individual indicators are compiled into a single index on the basis of
an underlying model. The composite indicator should ideally measure
multidimensional concepts which cannot be captured by a single
indicator.
The strengths and weaknesses of composite indicators largely
derive from the quality of the underlying variables. Ideally, variables
should be selected on the basis of their relevance, analytical
soundness, timeliness, accessibility, etc.
While the choice of indicators must be guided by the theoretical
framework for the composite, the data selection process can be quite
subjective as there may be no single definitive set of indicators. A
lack of relevant data may also limit the developer’s ability to build
sound composite indicators. Given a scarcity of internationally
comparable quantitative data from population census, for instance,
composite indicators often include qualitative data from surveys or
policy reviews mentioned above (in Chapter connected to the///).
Thus, the quality and accuracy of composite indicators should
evolve in parallel with improvements in data collection and indicator
development. The current trend towards constructing composite
indicators of country performance in a range of policy areas may
provide further impetus to improving data collection, identifying new
data sources and enhancing the international comparability of
statistics.
Taking into account all mentioned above, the following formula of
the demographic expansion composite indicator has been suggested:
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СIODE = ∑ Bi di, i=1,
where СIODE — value of the composite indicator (average
composite level of the demographic expansion);
i — number of the individual indicators included into the СIODE
calculation;
Bi — raw value of individual indicatori (number of balls obtained
by the each individual indicator the gives statistical characteristic of
the corresponding demographic expansion component);
di — weight associated to individual indicator included in theСIODE calculation.
The value of such composite indicator will be calculated in the
further research while the complete statistical data would be available.
However, even in the meantime it is possible to obtain the following
conclusions and recommendations.
SUBSTANTIAL CONCLUSIONS
Taking into consideration that during the last years increasing attention
is paid to various aspects of population expansion, it is quite important to
consider issues related to the definition, theoretical background as well as
to the economic and social consequences of this phenomena.
Using several statistical methods, author achieved results that
make possible to formulate the following important conclusions:
• More than half (about 57 per cent) of the increase of the
Ukrainian population between 2001 and 2014 was due to the direct
contribution of net migration and extremely high fertility rate of legal
and mostly illegal migrants.
• Differences in net migration assumptions between the ‘low’ and
the ‘high’ variant projections produce a range of variation of 0.60
million in the projected size of the Ukrainian population in 2030
(between 45.6 and 46.2 million).
• In the principal projection the cumulative net inflow of post-
2013 migrants accounts for 43 % of total population growth until
2030. A further 17 % of projected population growth is attributable to
the additional contribution of new migrants to natural change (i.e.
births and deaths). 
• The projected contribution of net migration to population change
considerably differs across the three Ukrainian constituent nations.
Without net immigration the Ukrainian’s population would stagnate
over the next two decades and decrease in the longer term.
• Net migration assumptions should be continually revised in the
projections, reflecting rising levels of net migration and the high
uncertainty of migration forecasting.
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ПОЛІТИКА ІНФОРМАЦІЙНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ:
НАУКОВО-ПРИКЛАДНІ АСПЕКТИ І ПРОБЛЕМИ
ПІДГОТОВКИ ФАХІВЦІВ
АНОТАЦІЯ. У роботі наведено аналіз найважливіших проблем сучаснос-
ті: безпеки інформаційних і комунікаційних систем, захисту від атак за
наявності інформаційних війн, розробки при цьому моделі власної поведі-
нки учасника кіберпростору. Показано, що підґрунтям для істотної про-
тидії зростанню злочинів у кіберпросторі може стати грамотна полі-
тика національних кадрів у галузі інформаційної безпеки.
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